Despite macroeconomic evidence pointing to a negative aggregate consumption response due to political uncertainty, few papers have used microeconomic panel data to analyze how households adjust their consumption after an uncertainty shock. We study household savings and expenditure adjustment from an unexpected, large-scale and rapidly evolving political shock that occurred largely in May 1989 in Beijing, China. Using monthly micro panel data, we present evidence that a surge in political uncertainty resulted in significant temporary increases in savings among urban households in China. Households responded mainly by reducing semi-durable expenditure and frequency of major durable adjustment. The uncertainty effect is more pronounced among older, wealthier, and more socially advantaged households. We interpret our findings using existing models of precautionary behavior. By focusing on time variation in uncertainty, our identification strategy avoids many of the potential problems in empirical studies of precautionary savings such as self-selection and life-cycle effects.
Introduction
Major political events, such as the US presidential election in 2000, the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the more recent Arab Spring, can have profound impacts on household consumption. For example, retail sales in the United States dropped by over 2.5% in September 2001, the month when the terrorist attack took place. These political shocks are often accompanied by an increase in policy uncertainty, where a growing literature shows that uncertainty shocks can have substantial economic impacts. 1 Despite the macroeconomic evidence pointing to a negative aggregate consumption response due to political uncertainty, very few papers have used microeconomic panel data to analyze how households adjust their consumption after an uncertainty shock. Detailed household consumption panel data are essential both to understand the channel through which households adjust their consumption and of the variation of the adjustments across different types of households.
However, most microeconomic data of consumer expenditure are collected at low frequency and have a long recall period.
2 Since uncertainty shocks are usually short-lived, the initial impact on household consumption often differs from the impact on future consumption when households gradually adjust to a new steady state. Without high-frequency consumption panels at household level, it is difficult to identify the size of the initial impact of an uncertainty shock and the path of dynamic adjustments afterwards.
Our first contribution is to analyzing household consumption around a time of escalating political uncertainty, using household panel data collected at monthly frequency from China. We exploit an unexpected, large-scale and rapidly evolving political shock that occurred largely in May 1989 in Beijing, China. The event, also known as the Tianʼanmen Square Movement, was triggered by the unexpected death of a former leader in mid-April 1989, culminated in May, and faded after the Chinese government took action on June 4 in the same year. The event resulted in a change in political leadership and is widely regarded to mark the end of a period of rapid reform in China.
1 See Bloom (2013) for a review of this literature. Empirical evidence suggests that uncertainty shocks have negative effects on growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995) , consumer spending (Romer 1990) , and investment and hiring (Bloom, 2009) . 2 The Consumer Expenditure Survey, the most commonly used household consumption data in the United States, reports quarterly expenditure from the interview sample. The interview sample follows survey households for a maximum of five quarters. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics collects data on food consumption based on the amount spent on food in an average week. Since interviews are usually conducted around March each year, it has been argued that people report their food expenditure for an average week around that period.
Following Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) and Bloom (2013) , we present two descriptive measures showing increased policy uncertainty associated with the political event.
Our empirical analysis is conducted using monthly micro panel data from a sample of the Urban
Household Survey in China. The monthly expenditure is based on detailed daily diary entries covering all types of household expenditures. Our empirical approach is simple: we compare the mean household savings in April, the month immediately before the rise in political uncertainty, and in May of 1989, when the uncertainty shock took place. Differences in savings between these months could still be due to seasonality of consumption and/or income. For the comparison group, we use data from April and May of 1990 to estimate the difference in outcomes and subtract it from the estimate of the effect obtained from the 1989 data (a difference-in-difference estimator).
One main advantage of using household panel data is that we are able to document the heterogeneity in the effects of uncertainty shock for different types of households and for different types of consumer expenditure. The micro data also allows us to control for household composition and demographic changes that may contaminate our results.
After adjusting for seasonality, we find that the saving rate increased by 18 percentage points in the month when the uncertainty shock culminated. The increase in savings was larger for households that had older heads, that were wealthier prior to the shock, and that were more socially advantaged. The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of household characteristics and to using household balance sheets as an alternative definition of savings. We are able to rule out any shocks to household resources from the political uncertainty, as there is no evidence of changes in average household income or wealth. We also do not find any significant change in idiosyncratic income uncertainty identified from realized income streams--neither the variance of permanent shocks nor the variance of transitory shocks change before and after the shock that took place in May 1989.
Interestingly, the increase in savings is entirely due to a sizable reduction in semi-durable consumption (i.e. clothing and footwear) and frequency of major durable adjustment. Non-durable consumption is not affected by the uncertainty shock. Our estimates survive a range of robustness and placebo tests. To the extent that pessimism is concerned with longer term prospects than those arising from short-term uncertainties, the estimated short-run effects are more likely due to changes in political uncertainty rather than pessimism per se.
We interpret our findings using existing models of precautionary behavior. Unlike many other uncertainty shocks (such as the Great Recession) which may also affect the balance sheet of households either directly (through a wealth or income shock) or indirectly (through a credit crunch), we show that the uncertainty shock we study has no direct or indirect impact on household balance sheets. Although our empirical specification is limited in further distinguishing between alternative channels that are associated with the political event (such as pessimism or disruption in daily activity), our estimates suggest that uncertainty is the most plausible channel driving our results (see Section 5.5 for a discussion). Our estimates on household savings therefore shed new light on the strength of the precautionary saving motive, where empirical estimates using microeconomic data have not yet converged. 3 Existing empirical tests on precautionary savings behavior almost all rely on cross-section differences in risk within the sample. The key identifying assumption is that the measure of risk must be exogenous; that is, it has to be uncorrelated with any other unobservables that might also determine consumer behavior. 4 However, cross-sectional differences in risks may be correlated with unobservable (and likely heterogeneous) characteristics of the household, such as risk aversion and prudence, which would affect consumption choices directly. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) show that correcting for self-selection into occupations decreases precautionary savings significantly. In addition, income risk may be correlated with life-cycle profiles of income and expected mean levels of income (Browning, Ejrnaes and Alvarez 2010) . This means that the estimated correlation between risk and savings that is coined as the precautionary motive may be contaminated by the life-cycle motive of savings.
Unlike previous papers that focused on cross-sectional variation in risk, our identification strategy exploits unanticipated time-variation in uncertainty, which is free from the potential biases caused by either self-selection or life-cycle motives. 5 Our estimates point to strong evidence of precautionary savings that is consistent with a buffer-stock model of consumer behavior (Carroll 1997) .
3 Existing estimates range from close to zero precautionary savings (e.g. Skinner 1988 , Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1992 , Dynan 1993 ) to significant precautionary savings accounting for substantial fraction of wealth accumulation (e.g. Carroll and Samwick, 1997 , 1998 , Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005 . Browning and Lusardi (1996) contain an excellent review of this literature. 4 The usual empirical test is to correlate consumption or savings with some measure of risk. Researchers have used cross-sectional variations either in realized income risk across occupations (Skinner 1988 , Carroll and Samwick, 1997 , 1998 or geographic regions (Carroll, Dynan and Krane, 2003) or in subjective risk expectations (Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1992 and Lusardi 1997) . 5 Giavazzi and McMahon (2012) is the only recent paper we know of to study the effect of policy uncertainty on households' savings and labor supply responses. Using micro data from Germany, they explore the closely contested German general election during which there was uncertainty over unemployment and pension rules. The political uncertainty we study is likely to be more severe or extensive. In addition, our monthly household expenditure survey with detailed expenditure diaries allows us to study the channel through which total consumption is adjusted following uncertainty shock.
Our findings on the mechanism of expenditure adjustment are also in line with a small set of empirical studies of the effects of microeconomic uncertainty on adjustment decision of durable goods. Foote, Hurst and Leahy (2000) find that the frequency of adjustment in the CEX is negatively related to the imputed variance of household income obtained from regressions estimated with PSID data, a proxy that may be contaminated by measurement error in income and by prediction errors due to the small information set available to the econometrician. Using subjective income uncertainty measures as instruments for consumption volatility, Bertola, Guiso and Pistaferri (2005) find that uncertainty leads to smaller adjustments of consumer durables at the extensive margin.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical predictions of a buffer-stock model in light of rising uncertainty. Section 3 describes the political events leading to the uncertainty shock and presents descriptive measures of uncertainty during the period. Section 4 describes the data and the sample in use, followed by our main empirical model and results presented in section 5. The final section concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical models of buffer-stock saving predict that household consumption would drop when faced with an uncertainty shock (e.g. Zeldes 1989 , Caballero 1990 , Kimball 1990 , Carroll 1997 .
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In an infinite-horizon buffer-stock saving model, Carroll (1992) shows the dynamic adjustment to a permanent increase in unemployment risk taking place between years t and t+1. Suppose that, prior to year t, the consumer was at equilibrium levels of consumption, net wealth, and saving ratios. In year t+1, the first year under the higher unemployment risk regime, the buffer-stock model implies that consumption drops sharply and the saving rate rises. Net wealth therefore begins to increase. After the initial adjustment, consumption slowly increases and the saving rate steadily declines toward their long-run steady states. In the new steady state, the consumption ratio is slightly lower than before the shock, while the saving rate and the net wealth ratio are both 6 Also see Parker (1999) and Browning and Crossley (2009) on how households adjust durable and nondurable spending when faced with income shocks. 7 Models of precautionary savings have focused on one specific type of uncertainty, namely labor income uncertainty. In our context, the political shock may also drive up uncertainty about returns on financial assets. Bank savings accounts are the only type of financial asset consumers invest in. With only one available financial asset, the implication of a rate of return uncertainty is the same as that of an increase in labor income uncertainty (Merton 1969 and Samuelson 1969). higher.
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The differences between initial adjustment of consumption and savings and future adjustment paths highlight the need for a high-frequency consumption panel in order to identify the extent of the precautionary saving motive. In the steady state of a buffer-stock saving model, average
consumption will approximately equal average income regardless of the level of uncertainty that the consumers face (Carroll and Samwick 1997) . If consumption data are collected at low frequency and consumers have already adjusted to the new steady state with the optimal amount of buffer-stock savings, there will be no apparent relation between current consumption or the current saving rate and the uncertainty of income. However, until the optimal buffer stock is achieved, there will be a relation between consumption and uncertainty: the consumer facing higher uncertainty will initially have to depress consumption more in order to build up a larger stock of wealth.
The Political Uncertainty Shock
Chinaʼs economic reforms started in 1978, after Deng Xiaoping came to power. The decollectivization of the agricultural sector was a huge success, leading to a 6.6 percent annual growth of the sector during the period 1979-1985. However, the reform in urban China starting in 1984 was characterized by cycles of overheating and austerity. Figure 1 shows the annual real GDP growth rate. The Chinese economy has gone through three cycles, with peaks in 1985, 1988 and 1992 . Each cycle began with periods of rapid growth, accompanied by accelerating inflation, and followed by prolonged contractions during which the growth rate and inflation declined in tandem (see for example Fan et.al 1996, Brandt and Zhu 2000) .
Despite facing an urban inflation rate of 9.1% for 1987 as a whole, the central government announced plans for a comprehensive price reform in June 1988. The justification given for such a price reform was that "long pain is no better than short pain" and that market prices should be put in place at once (Zhao 1999) . The price reform immediately resulted in unprecedented pressure on inflation and in panic buying, as documented in Aaberge and Zhu (2001) . The government had to make a policy U-turn within three months to stabilize the economy, thus leading to increased unemployment and public discontent. • April 18-22: Students gathered in Tianʼanmen Square to mourn Huʼs death prior to and during Huʼs memorial service on April 22 in the Great Hall of the People, calling for more freedom and democracy. However, their petition of demands and request for a meeting with Li Peng, the Premier, were rejected.
• April 26: (the turning point): The Peopleʼs Dailyʼs front-page editorial defined the student movement as an anti-party revolt that had to be resolutely opposed. The editorial enraged the student protesters, who fought for it to be retracted.
• April 27-May 19: The student protests escalated, and a hunger strike began on May 13, ahead • May 20-June 2: Martial law was declared in several districts in Beijing on May 20 after Zhao
Ziyang, who was accused of sympathizing with the students, was sidelined by hardliners.
However, the troops' advancement towards the city center was blocked by over a million workers and citizens.
• June 3-4: Troops were ordered to put down the "counter-revolutionary riot" by force. Live ammunition was fired as the army tried to break through the barricades, with estimates of civilian casualties ranging from hundreds to thousands. Beijing was under the full control of the army by June 4.
• June 5-9: Protests continued in other cities in mainland China, including Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, for several days. However, on June 9, the first public appearance 
Evidence of uncertainty shock
We provide two descriptive measures of the evolution of uncertainty during this period, following the work of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) . We should emphasize that neither piece of evidence maps directly into a single type of uncertainty which would affect consumption and saving decisions in a standard model (such as uncertainty in future labor income). Therefore, from these descriptive measures it is hard to make quantitative statements about the contribution of precautionary saving. Nevertheless, they are useful benchmark evidence for the existence of any uncertainty shock.
10 Sichuan is a mountainous province situated in the south-west of China. The provincial capital, Chengdu, is approximately 1,505 kilometers (935 miles) from Beijing.
Our first measure is the media mention of the word "uncertainty". We count the frequency of articles containing the words "China" and "uncertainty" or "uncertain" from three major news sources in Western media, The New York Times, The Financial Times, and The Economist, between February 1 and September 1, 1989. Figure 2 shows the frequency of newspaper articles by month. There is a dramatic increase in the number of articles relating to uncertainty in China from the beginning of May until early June, corresponding to the period of rapid development of the Movement. Thereafter, the numbers decrease and, by August of the same year, return to the same level as in early 1989.
Our second measure is that of stock market volatility around that time. China did not have a stock market in 1989, so we turn to the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong (a colonial territory of the UK at that time), which is closely connected to China. 11 Figure 
The Data
The data used in this paper is a four-year rotational monthly panel of 270 urban households in 
Definitions of income, consumption, and saving
Total household income can be decomposed into labor income, property income, transfer income, and special income, 14 accounting for 69.3%, 0.5%, 26.1%, and 4.1% of the total respectively in our pooled sample. Almost 80% of property income can be accounted for by interest income, with the rest coming from dividends and rents. This implies that the most important saving vehicle is savings accounts, consistent with under-development of the credit market in China at the time.
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There is no evidence of any significant change in the composition of real total household income over the sample period.
We disaggregate total household expenditure into three categories by durability of expenditures.
Our empirical analysis is performed on each category of expenditure, as well as total household 12 For instance, the Consumer Expenditure Survey for the United States and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the UK collect detailed household expenditure information based on two consecutive weekly diary records, supplemented with information about regular payments. 13 When the respondent suffers from poor literacy or in the case of households with a single person who is elderly, sick or disabled, the enumerator is responsible for the diary records. 14 Labor income includes base wage, floating wage, contract income, bonuses and subsidies, and other wage income from state or collectively owned units, income from self-employment, as well as income from reemployment by retired persons. Property income includes interest, dividends, and rents. Transfer income includes income from dependents, retirement income, price subsidies, and other transfer income. Special income refers to income from gifts, lodgers, survey subsidies, and property sales. 15 China's first stock exchange only began trading in December 1990.
consumption. Non-durable consumption is defined as expenditure on food, medicine and medical supplies, housing and building repairs, health and medical services, and education (school fees).
Semi-durables include clothing and footwear. Major durables comprise furniture, mechanical and electric goods for cultural and recreational activities, and mechanical and electric goods for daily use. Note that, in the period we study, the housing market was not developed and the majority of the urban households lived in rental housing that was publicly subsidized.
We define savings as the difference between monthly real total income and monthly real total consumptive expenditure at household level. Following Chamon and Prasad (2010), we do not deduct non-consumptive expenditure (loan interest, personal income tax and other taxes, maintenance/alimony, insurance cover, etc.) from savings. Furthermore, we use an alternative measure of savings based on the householdʼs balance sheet. This alternative measure, which is labeled "changes in financial wealth", is defined as the net changes from the beginning to the end of the month in the stock of financial asset holdings and spot cash. In the absence of nonconsumptive expenditure and errors in diary recordings, these two measures should be identical. into January 1988 constant prices, using monthly CPI series. 16 The average household income is 328 yuan per month, with 71% coming from labor income. The mean monthly household consumptive expenditure is 296 yuan, 73% of which was spent on non-durables, 14% on semidurables (that is, clothing and footwear) and 13% on major durables. By definition, the purchase of major durables is infrequent, with only 13.5% of households making positive purchases in any given month.
The mean real total household income in 1988 was only marginally higher than the mean real total consumptive expenditure, thus resulting in a saving rate of only 2.9%. This can largely be explained by consumersʼ switching from financial savings to purchases of durables after the outbreak of hyperinflation of around 20% p.a. in 1988 (see Aaberge and Zhu 2001 
Empirical Results
The main empirical model we use is a difference-in-difference (DID) estimator: real GNP growth is about 5% in both years) and we find no major policy changes that would influence consumption behavior between April and May in 1990. As a robustness check, we also experimented using both year 1990 and year 1991 as the control group to capture seasonal changes in the outcome of interest between April and May. The estimates are qualitatively similar (see discussion in the section dealing with robustness checks).
In the rest of this Section, we begin by presenting the estimates from equation (1) for a range of outcomes including savings, income, consumption and their components. Of particular interest is the estimated parameter 3 , which identifies the reduced-form impacts associated with the political event. We interpret the results in the framework of precautionary savings. In Section 5.5, we provide a detailed discussion of potential alternative interpretations of the results. size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. In order to focus on the extensive margin of the major durable expenditures, we use a dummy for spending at least 25% of household income in any month on major durables as the dependent variable in the last column. Column 1 shows that the shock to political uncertainty led to a significant drop in total household expenditure by around 46 yuan, which is equivalent to a 17% decrease relative to the mean total expenditure of 273 yuan for 1989 as a whole. The effect is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Main results
In the remaining columns, we disaggregate total consumption into three categories by the durability of the expenditure. Column 2 shows that there is no evidence of a treatment effect on non-durables. Columns 3 and 4 present the effect of the treatment on semi-durable consumptive expenditure as well as on the incidence of making major durable purchases. It is clear that while there is no significant treatment effect on non-durables, expenditure on semi-durables comprising clothing and footwear shows a statistically significant (p<0.01) drop as a result of the political uncertainty (Column 3). The 14.8 yuan decrease represents a 36% reduction of the mean monthly expenditure on clothing and footwear. Column 4 shows that political uncertainty resulted in large decreases in spending on major durables: the probability of making a durable goods purchase decreased by 6.3%, accounting for almost 50% of durable goods purchases at mean level in 1989. Table 3 focuses on the treatment effect on total household income as well as on its two components, labor income and non-labor income. Looking across the first row, we can see that the point estimates are invariably small and statistically insignificant at any conventional level. We therefore conclude that there is no evidence of any effect of the treatment on total household income or on any of its components. In particular, the small and insignificant estimate on labor income suggests that household labor supply was not affected by the uncertainty shock. We also exploited the panel feature of our data to estimate idiosyncratic household income uncertainty by month. Interestingly, there is no evidence that political uncertainty shock in our context translates into household income uncertainty identified using realized income streams.
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22 Following Meghir and Pisfaferri (2004) , we first regress log of household income on year-month dummies, dummies for household size and a quadratic in the age of the head. We take the predicted residual log income from this regression ( ) and identify the variance of permanent shocks in year-month t by (∆ (∆ + ∆ −1 + ∆ +1 )) where ∆ is change in predicted residual between year-month t and yearmonth t-1. The variance of transitory shocks (assuming i.i.d for simplicity) in year-month t is identified by − (∆ ∆ +1 ). The variances of permanent shocks in April and May of 1989 are 0.010(0.012) and 0.002(0.005), respectively (block-bootstrapped standard errors in brackets). The variances of transitory Since consumption is adjusted downwards whereas income is not affected, we would expect additional savings due to the uncertainty shock. Turning to the effect of the treatment on saving rates in Table 4 , we find that, for savings defined by either the household budget constraint or the household balance sheet, the uncertainty shock results in around 18 percentage point increases in saving rates. The increases are significant at the 5% levels. The stock market volatility from May through to the beginning of June is six times greater than the market volatility in April.
Consequently, one standard deviation increase in the variability of stock market prices leads to a 3 percentage point increase in household savings.
Heterogeneity in household responses
The availability of microeconomic consumption data allows us to disentangle the heterogeneity of estimated effects by household characteristics defined before the uncertainty shock. In Table 5 , we estimate our empirical model on log non-durable consumption, the incidence of making significant major durable purchases, and log total income and saving rates by age of head of household, by occupation of head of household, and by a proxy of wealth in the period before the uncertainty shock.
The sample is neatly split into two equally-sized halves using a cut-off age of 45 for the head of household. It emerges that the treatment effect on older families is far more pronounced, with a 24 percentage point increase in saving rates and an 11 percentage point decrease in the probability of major durable expenditure, both of which are also significant at the 1% level. While still positive, the effects on major durable purchases and savings for families headed by individuals aged below 45 are smaller in size and statistically insignificant. Younger households may have steeper expected income growth over the life cycle (due to the on-going economic reform) than the elder households have had. Furthermore, for urban households, pension was generously provided by the state (Chamon et. al. 2013 ). The political uncertainty would also lead to uncertainty over the pension. All these factors may induce the elder household to respond more dramatically to the uncertainty shock.
Our definition of white-collar occupations includes all professionals and technicians, senior and junior government officials, corporate managers and office clerks. Overall, they account for 47% shocks in April and May of 1989 are 0.026(0.006) and 0.018(0.006), respectively. Neither difference in permanent shocks nor transitory shocks is significant at conventional level.
of the occupations of the heads of households in our sample. Blue-collar refers to all remaining occupations. In the period of study, most of the enterprises are state-owned whose managers must be appointed or approved by the state. Government officials are also appointed and not elected by the public. Therefore, one would expect that the uncertainty from the pro-democracy political movement is greater for white-collar households. Indeed, we find larger impact on consumption and savings for white-collar households. For white-collar households, Table 5 shows that the treatment leads to a 30 percentage point increase in saving rates and a 9 percentage point decrease in the probability of major durable consumption, both with significance at the 5% level. For bluecollar households, the effect is less compared to their white-collar counterparts and not significantly different from zero, even at the 10% level.
We also disaggregate the sample by the amount of financial wealth prior to the uncertainty shock.
Looking at the treatment effect by wealth, we can see that the positive effect is driven by wealthier households with pre-period wealth above the median. The mean effects are a 25 percentage point increase in saving rates and a 6 percentage point decrease in the probability of major durable expenditure, with statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. By contrast, the treatment turns out to be more dampened and statistically insignificant for the poorer half of households. Wealthy households also have a higher spending on durables and semi-durables, both on the extensive and the intensive margin. Given that the main channel of adjustment is through reductions in durable and semi-durable expenditures, it is not surprising that the saving rate among the wealthy also increases the most.
To sum up, Table 5 suggests that the treatment effect on major durable purchases and saving rates is largely driven by older, wealthier, and more socially advantaged households. Moreover, in accordance with our main results based on the full sample, we find no evidence of any effect of the treatment on non-durable consumption and income in any of the subsamples.
Dynamic effect
In this section, we estimate our empirical model for six key outcome variables, only this time using June, July or August instead of May as the treatment group. The idea is to shed some light on the dynamics of the uncertainty shock beyond the initial impact. Following Dengʼs June 9 speech on the restoration of order, the extent of policy uncertainty may have gradually faded away. The new political leadership seized control of the economy with the ideology that central planning should be the focus, and the market should take on a subordinate role.
With declining policy uncertainty, households should begin to draw on the extra precautionary savings made under the riskier environment and revert to a higher level of consumption. The new steady-state level of consumption could still be lower than the initial steady-state of consumption if policy uncertainty remained permanently higher than previously. Table 6 shows that the magnitude of the decline in consumption (and the increase in saving rate) was much smaller in June compared to the changes in May. While the effects of the treatment on all types of consumption are negative, they are now much smaller. In the case of semi-durables, major durable purchases and savings, the sizes of the treatment effect are roughly halved and become statistically insignificant. Moving into July and August, the overall pattern is that the negative consumption adjustment in response to the uncertainty shock is much smaller (with the exception of semi-durables).
This exercise above highlights the importance of having high-frequency data in order to capture the effect of a large but short-lived shock to uncertainty, as in our case. Aggregated data at annual or quarterly frequencies would average out the initial consumption adjustment with subsequent adjustments. When there is an unanticipated increase in uncertainty (regardless of whether the increase in uncertainty is persistent or temporary), the buffer-stock model of precautionary savings will predict a sharpest jump in saving rate (and a sharpest drop in consumption) happening immediately after the uncertainty shock took place (e.g. Carroll (1992) , Chamon, Liu, Prasad (2013) ). Consistent with this prediction, we find that the magnitude of the decline in consumption (and the increase in the saving rate) is the largest in May 1989 when the uncertainty shock took place. For instance, relative to April 1989, the increases in saving rate are about 18 percentage points in May 1989 (Table 4 ) and between 9 to 13 percentage points from June 1989 to August 1989.
Robustness checks and measurement issues
We subject our previous estimates to a range of robustness checks. Table 7A presents further evidence of effect on the incidence of major durable adjustment with respect to different cut-offs, measured either as a share of total household income or as absolute values. Reduction of durable goods expenditures is driven by postponement of purchases of relatively large items of major durables--there is significant reduction in durable goods spending at the extensive margin, for large durables with total values of more than 100 yuan, or those accounting for more than 30% of total household income.
In Table 7B , we present three additional checks. First, in equation (1), we include a dummy variable equal to one if the year of observation falls in 1991 and estimate it using data from April and May of 1989, 1990, and 1991 . By doing so, the seasonality of our outcome variables between April and May is identified by changes between consumption in April and May in years 1990 and 1991. The point estimates remain similar when we use both 1990 and 1991 as the control group.
Second, we compare outcomes in June-Dec to outcomes in Jan-Mar in 1989, controlling for seasonality with the help of years 1990 and 1991. To the extent that pessimism is concerned with longer term prospects than those arising from short-term uncertainties, this placebo test would enable us to separate the effect of uncertainty from more general pessimism about the future. The results indicate that there is no statistically significant effect when we compare June-Dec to JanMar in 1989, suggesting that the effect is concentrated in April and May in 1989 and hence is more likely due to changes in political uncertainty rather than pessimism per se. Third, we conduct additional placebo test by using the same months (April and May as in our main specification) in years after the political event and calling one year as treatment and the other as control. We do not find any significant differences in any of the outcome variables.
It is worth mentioning that the monthly UHS expenditure data utilized in this paper is based on detailed daily diary entries covering all types of household expenditures. By contrast, most expenditure data from OECD countries are based on diaries for a short period (one or two weeks) and suffer from high non-response. In addition, UHS survey officials report very high response rates due to the extensive supervision by the local household survey divisions and a comprehensive set of instructions for Survey officials. 23 For these reasons, in comparison with other consumption panel data, the quality of the monthly UHS data should be relatively high. Nevertheless, it is useful to understand the implication of measurement error in the outcome variable such as consumption on our parameter of interest (the effect of the political event). For illustrative purpose, suppose the true regression model is:
where c i is the true consumption, z i is an independent variable which is measured without error (the political event). Suppose that, instead of c i , in the data we observe ̃ which is equal to the sum of the unobserved true consumption and a measurement error term ω i that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term ϵ i . Then,
The new error term includes both a component for measurement and a component for the original error in the regression. Therefore, when consumption is mismeasured, the error term on the righthand side has increased variance. The estimated effect of the political event remains unbiased, but the estimates will tend to have larger standard errors.
Alternative interpretations
We recognize that there may be alternative explanations (other than uncertainty channel) which may drive our empirical findings. One interpretation of our results could be that the drop in household consumption also reflects a slow-down in growth or an expectation of a slow-down,
give that China faced broad international sanctions following the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Our empirical specification is limited in distinguishing the slow-down in the mean growth from the uncertainty effect. However, our previous estimates suggest that neither total household income nor major components of household income is much affected by the political event (Table 3 ). In addition, although one might argue that the Western economic sanctions against China following the Tiananmen crackdown have affected China's export, GDP and consumers' expectations of growth, the first package of sanctions from the US was not passed by the US congress until June 29, 1989. The "pessimism" hypothesis might explain why we found some effect for July and August 1989, but it is much less convincing to explain the consumption patterns in May and June.
Another interpretation could be that a political shock like the Tian'anmen incident might have an immediate effect on economic activities, which gives people strong motives to stay at home (e.g.
because of fear) and postpone consumption until the society has recovered its normal state. If "disruption" is the main channel, we would expect close to zero spending on durable purchases for most households rather than just cutting back. On the contrary, our estimates above suggest that households are mostly cutting back large durable purchases rather than not spending at all. The richness of the data in consumption and income also allows us to investigate this potential alternative interpretation by conducting our analysis on three additional sets of outcomes.
Appendix Table A1 reports the effects of the political uncertainty on expenditures on energy (separately for water, electricity, gas, fuels) and transportation. If people stayed at home in event of a highly tensed period, we would expect water and energy consumption to increase (especially for electricity) and the expenditure on transportation to decrease. However, across different types of energy consumption, water and transportation expenditure, we find no significant effect of the political uncertainty. There appears to be little evidence that individuals stayed more at home during the period of political event. 24 As our second set of evidence, we estimate impact of the political uncertainty on food expenditures from catering (i.e. restaurants and takeaways).
Appendix Table A2 shows that none of these types of expenditure is affected by the political event,
providing additional support that economic activity (e.g. going out for food) did not slow down during this period. Appendix Tables Taken together, results from our additional analysis do not suggest that there was reduced economic activity during the period of political uncertainty. Therefore, the more plausible channel for households to postpone consumption into the future is through an increase in uncertainty and the need to build a larger buffer stock savings against future uncertainty.
Conclusion
We present evidence that a surge in political uncertainty resulted in significant temporary increases in savings among urban households in China. Our study exploits a large-scale unanticipated and rapidly evolving political event that took place in Beijing in 1989. Our estimates also suggest the channel through which increase in savings is achieved: the increase in savings is driven by reductions in semi-durable and frequency of major durable adjustment. The uncertainty effect is more pronounced among older, wealthier, and more socially advantaged households. We interpret our findings using existing models of precautionary behavior. By focusing on time variation in uncertainty, our identification strategy avoids many of the potential problems in empirical studies of precautionary savings such as self-selection and life-cycle effects. Our findings on the channel of adjustment also coincide with the predictions from models on durable good adjustment combined with income uncertainty. Our findings suggests that political uncertainties are costly: in the Chinese case, households saved more and consumed less due to political uncertainty, even when the increase in uncertainty was temporary in nature. In situations of prolonged political turmoil, the impact on household consumption is likely to be greater. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Annual GDP growth Note: Saving rate is defined as the ratio of savings to income; saving rate2 is the ratio of changes in financial wealth to income. Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after group dummy, and the full set of control variables which include household size, female head of household, as well as a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Treatment: 1989 , Control: 1990 -1991 Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Note: Regressions control for a treatment group dummy, an after-group dummy, and the full set of control variables, which include household size, female head of household, and a quadratic in the age of the head of household. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Floating wage and contract wage were only implemented in State-Owned Enterprises in later years.
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